

BMW-Stiftung Herbert Quandt

Hans J. Morgenthau - The Heritage, Challenge and Future of Realism

Round-Table Workshop October 28-30, 2004

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Current Forms of Foreign Policy Realism – Reflection on political realism in Germany



Abstract

This paper is intended to propose some thoughts concerning Hans Morgenthau's influence on current forms of realist thinking. Drawing on familiar interpretations of Morgenthau's earlier thought¹ I will give emphasis to the activist role in Morgenthau's career. Why did he receive so much attention? What were the causes for his wide-ranging influence?

Accordingly, some thoughts concerning realist thinking in Germany are added. Upon reflecting on future realist research fields, I finish the article by analyzing some challenges for German foreign policy from a realist perspective.

One principle is undeniable: an over-extensive research agenda is likely to lead to a loss of identity of the specific school of thought that calls itself realism. But as an American judge notoriously said about pornography, so too with realism: we may not be able to define it, but we know it when we see it.² It is nevertheless useful to make regular attempts to formulate explicit categories of what political realism could be and what analytical values it can offer.

Before I proceed with my detailed argument let me begin with two additional remarks.

The first concerns my own understanding of Morgenthau's realism and its meaning for the theory and practice of international relations and the second comment deals with the general attitude toward realism in Germany.

To read Morgenthau is more than to read academic literature. Morgenthau humbly taught his readers to interpret history in all its complexity. And this is an important requirement in a world in which the strongest also claims to be the most moral player. Morgenthau: "It is easier and more satisfactory to conclude that political and military superiority necessarily go hand in hand with moral superiority. Here again moral pride stands between our judgement and historical experience"³

¹ Christoph Frei (2001): *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*. Louisiana. Louisiana University State Press. Greg Russell (1990): *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge. M. Benjamin Mollov (2002): *Power and Transcendence - Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*. Lexington Books: Oxford.

² Jack Donnelly (2000): *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press: 9.

³Hans J. Morgenthau: *The Lessons of World War II's mistakes – Negotiations and Armed Power Flexibly Combined*. *Commentary*, October 1952: 333.

against a US commitment in Vietnam and his work for the release of Soviet Jews are living testimonies to his commitment.

Morgenthau's agent-centric and respectively the state-centric worldview is the important tool to proliferate his deeply moral messages. His and Niebuhr's thinking was the antithesis against an alleged mainstream way of thinking in the US⁷. They introduced tradition of *raison d'état* into an American milieu that was influenced by eighteenth-century optimism and nineteenth century belief in progress.

Morgenthau relied on the truth factor of his analyses – a claim that is not scientific. But his intention was indeed not primarily scientific. Chicago students he told in an answer: “What you are really saying – I regard this as a compliment – is that I have destroyed some of the illusions with which you entered. I am here to prevent you from going home with the same illusions with which you came. *This is the purpose of teaching – to confront people with the truth.*“⁸ It was the political reality that he wanted to influence. Although he was a complex thinker, he knew he had to keep it simple in order to have an impact. To Hannah Arendt he wrote: “We are intellectual streetfighters... So if we don't make clear on which side of the barricades we stand we have failed. Are you for or against the crucifixion of Christ? I guess some of our ancestors voted for Barnabas. They were wrong”⁹ Morgenthau's Chicago Lectures of 1952 prove that Morgenthau's concern was more than academic.

Morgenthau created pressure for a new basis of foreign policy judgement, a new rhetoric that is grounded in the necessity of political assessment and compromise¹⁰ This especially becomes clear in his provocative opus *In Defense of the National Interest*. Morgenthau criticised people that created a climate of political expectations that could not be satisfied. The correct understanding of world politics should be based on a sober, anti-ideological judgement of politics. His plea was for a clear power analysis and a subsequent formulation of a realistic national interest: “A foreign policy, to be successful, must be commensurate with the power available to carry it out.”¹¹

Morgenthau attacked observers who accentuated the exceptionalist existence of the US. The easy conquering of the continent had created a frame of power that relied too heavily on the “moral superiority” of the United States that was not reality¹². In the early twenty-first century Morgenthau would have attacked neoconservative thinkers like Richard Perle or Charles Krauthammer who disguise themselves as realists¹³.

Morgenthau (as well as Niebuhr) worked with the rhetorical tools to provoke and partially convey anxiety, heighten a sense of irony and paradox, and identify Christian virtue as a

⁷ Morgenthau's anthropological pessimism did not tempt him to pursue the concept of collective guilt [Morgenthau (1970): *Truth & Power*: 374] against the Germans although did not want to live in Germany any more [Bernard Rosenberg/Ernest Goldstein (1982): *Creators and Disturbers. Reminiscences by Jewish Intellectuals of New York*. Columbia University Press: 81.] But Morgenthau knew that there existed German Jewish anti-Semitism directed at Eastern Jews. His negative view on collective human behavior was influenced by Nietzsche (Frei 2001) who condemned masses of men as stupid flock without moral scruples [Friedrich Nietzsche 1996: *Der Wille zur Macht*. Kröner: 108]. He did not derive his conclusions solely from the bitter experience of the Holocaust. Morgenthau was made familiar with the fact of the Holocaust 1944. (Rosenberg/Goldstein 1982: 77.)

⁸ Chicago Lectures „Philosophy of International Relations“ July 30, 1952. In: Morgenthau Papers Box 81: 38.

⁹ Morgenthau to Arendt, June 5, 1969. Arendt-Papers No. 8721, Arendt-Zentrum, Oldenburg.

¹⁰ Thomas G. Goodnight: Morgenthau – In Defense of the National Interest. In: Francis Beer/Robert Hariman: (1996): *Post-Realism – The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*. East Lansing. Michigan State University Press: 150.

¹¹ Hans J. Morgenthau (1951): *In Defense of the National Interest*. New York: 118.

¹² Hans J. Morgenthau: ‘Another Great Debate‘; *The National Interest of the United States*. In: *The American Political Science Review*, December 1952: 970.

¹³ Bradley A. Thayer: *The Pax Americana and the Middle East: US-Grand Strategic in the Region after September 11*. *Mideast Security and Policy Studies*, Nr. 56. Dezember 2003: 4.

compromise between two extremes¹⁴. Their message as US citizens was simple: the drama of history is not to be played for the sake of *our* security, *our* nation or *our* civilization. They wholeheartedly fought against the sin of nationalist universalism that would provoke resistance and unconditional forms of conflict¹⁵. Gilpin drives their point home: “Nationalists may be realists, but realists are not necessarily nationalists”¹⁶ But for realists nationalism remains one of the most powerful dangers for world peace¹⁷ (Mearsheimer 2001).

What makes Morgenthau’s power approach difficult, is the fact that he uses the notion of power in a dual sense (Rohde 2004: chapter 5). While his historical macro analysis leads to a materialist interpretation of power that is founded in a structural and a transcendental explanation of conflict, he also moves to the micro analytical level where he interprets power as “a psychological relationship between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.” That means that power is transferred to the level of the social relationship. This is a radical intellectual step from an understanding of politics as the realm of necessity¹⁸ to a voluntaristic understanding of politics. It is both an overall power structure *and* an ontological quality of evil that condition the causes of conflicts.

Morgenthau’s activist understanding of politics becomes obvious in his radical measures against the Vietnam war. He expresses his deeper motivations to Arendt: “I am too busy to do what I really want to do. But then, one has to do one’s duty, especially when it is almost literally a question of life and death.”¹⁹

And in this spirit he tried to convert politicians like Brzezinsky, George McBundy, McNamara or Henry Kissinger²⁰

Morgenthau was occupied with survival issues. He made his points with the help of resolute rhetoric: In “the life of nations peace is only respite from trouble – or the permanent peace of extinction.” At the beginning of the cold war, he often used the Munich analogy in order to determine the extent of the Soviet danger and to warn against a false strategy of appeasement.²¹ He knew that everyone, at least the general public, would understand what he wanted to say when he used these heartfelt metaphors. Later, he warned the US not to leave Israel alone in its struggle against the Arab nations and compared Israel’s situation with that of Czechoslovakia in ’38²². He did not trust Kissinger whom he thought would endanger Israel with “salami tactics” and recommended Israel to prepare unilaterally for peace. “When your life’s at stake, you can’t be flexible.” Morgenthau aimed to change in the way of thinking about politics before concrete policies could be changed in the longer term. His targeted use of metaphors and historical analogies²³, performed different tasks that Morgenthau, as praeceptor Americae, pursued: (1) They helped to define the nature of the situations with which the decision-makers were confronted (2) helped to assess what was at

¹⁴ James Arnt Aune: Niebuhr and the Rhetoric of Christian Realism. In: Beer/Hariman (1996): 80.

¹⁵ On dehumanising ideologies as sources of violent conflicts see Steven Van Evera (1999): *Causes of War*. Cornell University Press: 25-27/257. On the strategy of nationalist myth-making and the increased risk of conflicts through targeted threat exaggeration see Jack Snyder/Karen Ballantine (1996). *Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas*. In: (1997): *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 65-70.

¹⁶ Robert Gilpin (2001): *Global Political Economy – Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton: 15.

¹⁷ John Mearsheimer: (2001): *The Tragedy of Power Politics*. Chicago.

¹⁸ Friedrich Meinecke (1962): *Machiavellism. The doctrine of raison d’Etat and its place in modern history*. Routledge and Paul. London.

¹⁹ Morgenthau to Arendt, July 7 1965. Arendt-Papers No. 8724.

²⁰ Rohde (2004): 247.

²¹ An analogy that McBundy and public figures later applied themselves against Morgenthau’s anti-Vietnam attitude. George McBundy’s statement in CBS Special Report: „Vietnam Dialogue: Mr. Bundy and the Professors“. Transcript of radio discussion of June 10, 1965, 22–23.00 (E.T.): 28. In: MP Box 172.

²² Mollov 2002: 183.

²³ Neta C. Crawford (2002): *Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonialization, and Humanitarian Intervention*. Cambridge University Press: 18.

stake (3) provided a way to give concrete policy prescriptions. Later, Morgenthau weighed up different options that should indicate how the policy makers could deal with these identified situations. He painted vivid pictures of reality and often accomplished his ends through exaggeration. Morgenthau, who was deeply sceptical concerning the influence of public opinion on foreign policy²⁴ (Morgenthau 1973: 146-147), began using civilian instruments in order to persuade the decision-makers to change their course. This is paradox, but Morgenthau had to revise his preference for a nearly isolated idealtype of the statesman (in a Platonic sense) which he seemed to represent in his historical analyses (see especially his Chicago Lectures 1952). Nevertheless: the advent of nuclear weapons convinced Morgenthau that human security would depend on “the moral quality of leaders and their willingness to place the common goal of survival over the pursuit of unilateral advantage”.

Later Morgenthau extended his perspective on world politics. His commitment for the Soviet jewry led him to an astounding change of heart in his dealings with human rights issues. He began to open the black box of the state because he had built personal relationships to persecuted jews²⁵ (Mollov 2002: 77f.) His personal experiences helped him to change his view on détente with the UdSSR²⁶.

But his pessimistic worldview remained. Politics would always be a struggle for power that sometimes could be mitigated peacefully, sometimes not. Owing to finite resources and a finite lifetime, at least some basic resource and prestige conflicts are inevitable. Some conflicts might be reconcilable with the help of constructivist discourse techniques (diplomacy) and institutional processes²⁷ but many are not. The anarchy assumption of anthropological realism consists of a parsimonious understanding of systemic anarchy (non-existence of any governmental authority/permissive condition for conflicts) But the negative consequences of anarchy become more serious, because men are no angels.

The anthropological realist cannot share the permanent value of a theory of hegemonic stability that assumes huge power asymmetries in the international system as stabilizing factor although the existence of global hegemony can help to make some issue-specific regimes work²⁸ Power in Morgenthau’s understanding is seen as too dangerous to be kept in an unequal proportion on the political (military) level. Psychological, biological, historical path-dependent, cultural and spiritual reasons speak against the rational and self-contained use of power of one untouchable superior actor in world politics²⁹ Only tactical acceptance of coincidentally originated hegemony can be explained, but for anthropological realists this hegemony should be the “unipolar moment”, not a unipolar structure that most neoclassical realists³⁰ and many liberals³¹ deem beneficial. Steven Walt, defensive realist, claims: “Potential rivals will be unwilling to invite the “focused enmity” of the United States, and key U.S. allies like Japan and Germany will prefer to free-ride on U.S. protection rather than to create stronger military forces of their own.”³²

In the global power struggle asymmetrical warfare seems to be the natural consequence of an asymmetrical power distribution in the international system.

²⁴ Morgenthau (1973): *Politics Among Nations*: 146-147.

²⁵ Mollov (2002): 77-80.

²⁶ House Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Détente: Hearings*. 93. Kongress, 2. Sektion, 8./15./22. Mai; 10./ 12./26. June; 17./25./31. July 1974. Washington D.C. US. Government Printing Office: 147.

²⁷ Morgenthau (1973): 517-519.

²⁸ Robert O. Keohane (1984): *After Hegemony*. Princeton.

²⁹ Kenneth Waltz: *Structural Realism after the Cold War*. In: *International Security* 25 (2000) 1: 5-41.

³⁰ E. g., William C. Wohlforth: *U.S. Strategy in A Unipolar World*. In: In: G. John Ikenberry (ed.): *America Unrivaled. The Future of the Balance of Power*. Ithaca 2002. Cornell University Press.

³¹ See comprehensively Ikenberry (2002): *America Unrivaled. The Future of the Balance of Power*.

³² Stephen M. Walt: *Keeping the World „Off-Balance“: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy*. In: Ikenberry (2002): 128.

The anthropological realist has no salvation for the many zero-sum-games that constitute the precarious existence of individuals and states but it has two (rather abstract) imperatives that should guide political interaction:

1. try to construct transparent regional material power balances as far as possible.
2. In a highly unequal world at least let the agents of different regions, economic and military capacities, cultures and religions feel equal because respect and dignity need not be scarce resources.³³

State of the Art in Germany

The German understanding of international relations is strongly influenced by the peculiarities of German history and German intellectual history, and is perhaps a product of the interplay of both factors. (That does not exclude the fact the West German foreign policy under Adenauer was deeply *realpolitisch*).

But Germany's intellectual *Sonderweg* is comprehensible. Some philosophers that influenced the German history of international relations have been berated as power apologists while "soft philosophers" with pacifistic attitudes³⁴ have received much more attention.

Max Weber's and Friedrich Meinecke's views on international politics are too easily dismissed as simply positivistic and *realpolitisch*. Governance theorists like Niklas Luhmann and Fritz Scharpf as well as Ulrich Beck have conquered the market of international relations although their own domain once belonged to policy research.³⁵ These thinkers give emphasis to the soft variables of political interplay that stress transnational processes, multi-level governance, socialization processes between international institutions and states on one hand and states and domestic civil societies on the other hand. Additionally, the analysis of communication processes, in reality sociological questions, has received a lot of attention in the field of international relations³⁶. This topic mostly concerns the role of NGOs in international negotiation processes and societal processes in general. But the causal tests for their explanations are mostly restricted to the research field "European Union".

Christian Hacke criticises that the border between social theory and the discipline international relations has been become too vague³⁷. New shooting stars in the German IR claim, however, that is very difficult to find any authentic realists in the German IR any more³⁸. They claim that the discipline has developed a structure that has abandoned the territorial division of the international system in favour of an issue-oriented arrangement. Although this may be true for some issue areas, such as environmental policy or civil society issues, this diagnosis completely neglects the state-centric base of international security issues. The drawback is a loss of expertise in the field of international security.

The whole state-centric perspective, a central assumption of the mainline realist school, is called into question. The penetration of borders as a political principle is regarded as a "quasi-axiom". Wæver argues convincingly: "Germany (is) in important ways the most deeply Europeanized country, and, therefore, from German scholars being prone to the most radical

³³ Richard Sennett (2003): *Respect in a world of inequality*: New York: Norton. Amitai Etzioni (2004): *From Empire to Community. A New Approach to International Relations*. New York.

³⁴ Siemon-Netto (2002). "Sonderweg: The closing of the German mind". In: *The National Interest*. Winter 2002.

³⁵ See tendencies in Siegfried Schieder/Manuela Spindler (ed.): *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen*. UTB.

³⁶ The classical study is J. Habermas: *Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie*; in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 7/98: 804f.

³⁷ Michael Zürn: *Die Entwicklung der Internationalen Beziehungen im deutschsprachigen Raum nach 1989*. In: Gunther Hellmann/Klaus Dieter Wolf/Michael Zürn (2003): *Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen – Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

³⁸ Gerhard Holden: *The state of the art in German IR*. In: *Review of International Studies*, July 2004: 451-458.

postsovereign interpretations of integration”³⁹ Several psychological factors can explain this relatively radical renunciation of the state-centric perspective in Germany: (1) the long enduring limitation of German sovereignty, (2) the existence of a decentralized federal state, (3) the openness of an export-oriented economy, (4) the perception that with the help of negotiations with an enemy all things are possible (e.g., withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1994) (5) the decrease of military threats in the early 90s, (6) the one-sided comparison of the state to an instrument of power (in Carl Schmitt’s sense) that basically causes evil. (7) the peaceful revolution that resulted in German reunification.

Werner Link shows convincingly that the German IR scholars focus one-sidedly on the domestic dimensions of the social principle of checks and balances to the neglect of this meaning in the domain of international relations⁴⁰ (Link 2002: 33). One of the fruitful approaches that saves an elaborate state-centric perspective in Germany is taken by Wolf⁴¹: he shows that states can save their freedom of action (modern reason of state) against their own societies by pointing toward their international (institutional) constraints. So too in the other direction. States try to achieve concessions in international negotiations by stressing the domestic constraints. The state interest is maintained, but it is connected to the international system *and* to domestic politics as well.

But what are the systematic results of realist thinking in Germany?

The harvest of the rare species realist in Germany

Realist thinking in Germany has limited influence. This regrettable intellectual vacuum is not foremost the result of a lack of quality in the field but a result of ignorance within the scientific community.

But one connecting attribute characterises the shrinking realist community in Germany: German realists do not accept a pure positivist interpretation of realism. They see a complementary relationship between systemic theory and foreign policy analysis, especially stressing the voluntaristic aspects of politics⁴² The integration of subsystemic variables into a realist theory of international politics has received early attention in Germany and is the result of a constructive debate between Hans J. Morgenthau and his student Gottfried-Karl Kindermann. The output of this discussion was the creation of a multimethodic approach called “synoptic realism”. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann extended Morgenthau’s realism toward a *methodology of situation-analysis and situation-evaluation* (constellation analysis)⁴³ This approach governs individual research designs with the help of a set of diagnostic questions. The theory is based upon an anthropological foundation (Kindermann 1963) but claims (falsifiable) empirical research mediated through dialectically arranged analytical categories. Kindermann includes six categories for inquiry. He asks how decision-makers define the role of power in achieving foreign-policy goals that are based on a rather permanent concept of the national interest. Through the category “norm and advantage” Kindermann intends to deconstruct ideological postulates that most often serve states as justifications for a concrete foreign policy. In short, Kindermann tries to explain the behavior of individual agents within an international constellation.

Werner Link has made use of Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism and has applied his thought on the process of European integration. He convincingly shows that the EU consists of different nations with still very real national interests. The enlargement process and the

³⁹ Ole Wæver (1998): The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. In: International Organization 52-4: 706.

⁴⁰ Werner Link (2002): Hegemonie und Gleichgewicht der Macht. In: Mir A. Ferdowsi: Internationale Politik im 21. Jahrhundert. München: 33.

⁴¹ Klaus Dieter Wolf (2000): Die neue Staatsräson. Baden-Baden.

⁴² E.g. Alexander Siedschlag (2001): Realistische Perspektiven internationaler Politik. Opladen: 22-24.

⁴³ James E. Dougherty/Robert L. Pfalzgraff, (1996): Contending Theories of International Politics: 15.

conference in Nice and negotiations concerning the EU constitution have shown that the dispute over voting rights is nothing other than a power play. States use the integration process to strengthen their independence, not to abandon it. Link introduces the concept of an *integrative balance-of-power*⁴⁴. What seems to be a semantic contradiction is a double-edged concept: the integration process should enable the nation-states to remain competitive in a demanding global environment and it should help to outbalance the more influential participants of the union and reduce their intra-security-dilemma (Snyder 1999). The European integration did not take place in a vacuum. “Despite its intellectual appeal, federalism has never proved to be a successful route to political integration, and its successes have been achieved only under unusual political circumstances... the two most successful federal republics –Switzerland and the United States – were created in response to powerful external security threats.”⁴⁵ The same can be said for the EU.

Therefore, if the stakes are high enough the vital interests of states become obvious: „(The) candidates from the former Soviet bloc refuse to define Europe’s *raison d’être* in a foreign and security policy reflexively opposed to the United States.”⁴⁶ They rely on the protective shield of the US against an ever threatening Russia. All the institutional frameworks break down if the questions of war and peace are on the agenda.

Conclusion

The biggest problem of German foreign policy realism is the lack of systematic empirical research. Although several appropriate research designs exist they are not applied in their entirety. If German neorealists are not completely ignored, then they are simply equated with Waltz’s (mostly misunderstood) structural realism and consequently criticised as a homogeneous school of thought. The fact that realist thinking in Germany has no foothold is understandable because Germany lacks an overall strategic orientation in its foreign policy. A foreign policy without a historical backbone is a dangerous and unsound thing. A stronger influence of political realism would be desirable.

Additional remarks concerning the future of foreign policy realism

The future of realism lies in the insistence of the assumption that material factors first and foremost determine the behavior of states and other international players.

That means that a realist theory has to deal with probable causes of conflicts that can be derived from material conditions between different agents. Realism is challenged to explain the fact of underbalancing against the dominant actor in the global system.⁴⁷ Realism can remain convincing as a “school of thought” if it

1. has the courage to formulate a specific worldview (extrascientific assumptions), making it explicit (ultimate causes: christian realism, Nietzschean or Freudian psychologism, evolutionary theory). So it can enervate the popular accusation to follow its own ruler-affirmative ideology. Realism is a belief system that cannot be proven or disproven by empirical research. But realism can (1) give reasons for the plausibility of its own worldview in a moral discourse⁴⁸ and it can derive hypotheses

⁴⁴ Werner Link (2001a): Die Entwicklungstendenzen der Europäischen Integration (EG/ EU) und die neorealistische Theorie. In: Zeitschrift für Politik, September 2001: 304/312.

⁴⁵ Gilpin 2001: 349.

⁴⁶ John Vinocur: „A big unhappy family“ in: *IHT* vom 19. Februar 2003.

⁴⁷ Randall L. Schweller: Unanswered Threats – A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing. *International Security*, Vol. 29., No. 2, Fall 2004.

⁴⁸ Kenneth W. Thompson: *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1960.

that can be empirically tested (ontological claims about the natural world that are combined with epistemological, procedural, claims about how to receive new knowledge. These two kinds of reasoning need to be carefully separated. The most scientific attempt to combine theoretical research with empirical findings is the application of sociobiology: „ ...realists can use evolutionary theory to advance arguments supporting offensive realism without depending on the anarchic international system. Offensive realists argue that states seek to maximize power because competition in the international system to achieve security compels them to do so. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusion, but the causal mechanism is at the first image (the individual) rather than the third image (the international system).”⁴⁹ In evolutionary theory, domination usually results in particular individuals in social groups having *regular privileges of access to resources in competitive situations*. But, as a pure sociobiological approach could bear moral burdens, it should be restricted to explaining permissive conditions for ethnic conflicts.

2. defends the probability assumption that material explanations for state behavior are more convincing than ideational ones. The shifting of power structures⁵⁰ (Zakaria 1998/Gilpin 1981) should be the most influential, but not the exclusive variable for the explanation of systemic developments and foreign policy behaviour of individual players. But for the explanation of concrete foreign policies, soft variables in complementary research designs are needed (domestic or process variables). There should not be an artificial “either – or” between systemic and foreign policy analysis⁵¹ (Waltz 1986: 328).
3. subsequently dares to build grand strategy explanations or grand narratives⁵² and geopolitical scenarios and analyses of resource distributions and its consequences (Schweller 1999, Umbach 2003). The school of realism is organically connected with the idea of a long-term national interest that determines the behavior of international agents (Morgenthau 1952) and which is provable only in long-term analyses. This understanding of national interest need not be a static one, but it should help to identify traditional behaviors of states that can serve as guideposts also for micro-analysis (secondary constructivist research, see e.g. Kindermann 1985). The behavior of a singular unit can be derived from its material position in the system as well as from the core values (identity) of the state and its elites⁵³ A realist identity concept has to be interpreted as a relatively static variable.⁵⁴ But realism has to sharpen its strongest weapon by elaborating the materialist power analysis through the integration of economic parameters (e.g. growth rates of S+T, R+D of different states, knowledge

⁴⁹ Bradley A Thayer.: Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, And International Politics. *International Security*, Vol. 25., No. 2: (Fall 2000):

⁵⁰ Fareed Zakaria (1998): *From Wealth to Power*. Princeton. Robert Gilpin (1981): *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge.

⁵¹ Kenneth Waltz: *A Response to My Critics*, In: Robert O.Keohane (1986): *Neorealism and Its Critics*.

⁵² Mearsheimer (2001); Christopher Layne: *The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise*, *International Security*, Spring 1993. Christopher Layne: *America as European Hegemon*. In: *The National Interest*, Summer 2003.

⁵³ See Henry Nau (2002): *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, who synthesizes the concepts of power and identity toward a kind of ‘constructivist realism’. See also John M. Owen IV: *Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy; or, Benignity Is in the Eye of the Beholder*. In: G. John Ikenberry (ed.): *America Unrivaled*. Cornell University Press: 241.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel: *Social Constructivism in global and european politics*. In: *Review of Int. Studies*. Vol. 30, No. 2. April 2004.

transfer indicators and wider strategic fields such as space. Knowledge dominance is one of the key factors of US dominance⁵⁵.

4. can explain the origins of different configurations in world politics without having to rely on a static bias of how it characterizes the international system. The international system is a realm of insecurity that at a particular point in time is more prone to violence and at another point less dangerous. The intellectual divide between “offensive” (Mearsheimer 2001) and “defensive” (Walt 1987/Van Evera 1999/Jervis 1999) realism⁵⁶ embodies huge differences concerning the precepts that should be given for decision-makers in international politics. Both understandings should not become a dogma but rather should be adapted to suit individual situations. But a complementary systematic theory of proximate causes of conflicts is desirable. The character of international politics is profoundly influenced by whether states at a particular moment in history are status quo or revisionist powers. But the structure of the armament also explains a good deal about war or peace in world affairs. This structure is open to constructive manipulation.⁵⁷
5. If it provides an irreducible core of normative convictions for the construction of a viable world order (e. g. communitarian ethics, ethics of intervention, just war doctrine), because many self-proclaimed normativists in international relations claim: “There is no such thing as ethical foreign policy”. Michael Doyle, himself a liberal, argues: “Realist moral philosophy makes Realist political science coherent; Realist political science provides an essential description that is needed to justify Realist ethics.”⁵⁸ (Doyle 1997:19.) A realist ethics represents an ethics of human equality. It condemns universalist-imperialist attempts to create a uniform world society, e. g. through imposed neoclassical (economic) policy prescriptions by the IMF that neglect specific local and political conditions (Gilpin 2001: 64-65). It claims (1) a basic “survival ethics”, achieved by a Global Security Authority that relies on minimal multilateral principles in the war against terrorism and against nuclear proliferation. It sharply denies the neoconservative ideas of a new domino theory for the Middle East. The claim of the Bush administration to arbitrarily intervene against every possible danger is seen as futile for world peace: „In terms of the power he now claims, without significant challenge, George W. Bush is now the closest thing in a long time to dictator of the world.“⁵⁹ A realist-communitarian approach accepts the free development of different states and societies. The fundamental division is not between democratic and non-democratic peoples or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and non-decent or outlaw peoples. States have to solely accept minimal rules of international behavior⁶⁰. It attempts a synthesis between “Western” civil society and “Eastern” communal elements. This “synthesis of autonomy with social order, a synthesis based largely on moral codes and normative controls”⁶¹ provides a good way to avoid dangerous kinds of messianisms in international affairs like democratic imperialism. A gradually expanding supranational Global Antiterrorism Authority can foster a

⁵⁵ Robert L. Paarlberg, Knowledge as Power – Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security. In: *International Security*, Vol 29., No. 1 (Summer 2004): 122-151. Barry Posen: *Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony*. *International Security*, Vol 28., No. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46.

⁵⁶ For offensive realism see Mearsheimer 2001; for defensive realism we find as one of the first representatives Stephen M. Walt (1987) *The Origin of Alliances*. Ithaca.

⁵⁷ “The offense-defense balance and perceptions of it are far more manipulable than the polarity of the international system, the strength of international institutions, human nature, or other war causes that have drawn close attention.” Van Evera (1999): 191.

⁵⁸ Michael Doyle (1997): *Ways of War and Peace*. W. Norton & Company: 19.

⁵⁹ Michael Kinsley: „By Whose Authority?“ in: *WP* March 21, 2003.

⁶⁰ Comprehensively see John Rawls (1999): *The Law of Peoples*: 37

⁶¹ Etzioni 2004: 24.

denationalised issue-oriented global “police force” that deals with regional or local hard cases like genocides or proliferation cases Humanitarian intervention is no longer taboo for realists, but it has to be adopted very carefully and covered by a strategy of selective engagement.

6. shows a way to reliably analyse the structure of world politics and the global economy in its interdependence. While neoclassical economy implies the principle of equality and reciprocity in macroeconomic relationships, the political sphere is characterised by huge inequalities. How do these different spheres interact?⁶² Realism claims that high politics determines the outcomes of international relations, be it in the economic, environmental or any other political realms. This must be made proven in a microtheoretical theory of negotiations. But the same is to be done conversely: realism must develop a set of tools that aid it in identifying the consequences of micropolitics for “high politics”, e.g. terrorism and other transnational networks.⁶³ Time constraints like election campaigns which inhibit longterm solutions in serious global issues confirm Morgenthau’s proverb that “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the *ultimate aim*” The shadow of the future in international politics is an uncertain entity when material interests are at stake.
7. has the courage to pose the hard questions. E.g., what are the geostrategic advantages of the U.S. intervention in Iraq? The US pursues several geopolitical aims in Iraq: the creation of a pro-American government in Baghdad and the establishment of bases to facilitate power projection: “...bases (for the US) are available in the region. Iraq should become the rock upon which the United States projects power.”⁶⁴ Afghanistan has additional strategic meaning. The US have a better reach toward bases in southwest Asia – Bagram, Kandahar, Khost, Lwara, Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well as British-controlled Diego Garcia. “New Europe” offers important opportunities. The air bases Podwicz and Krzesiny in Poland, 3 bases in Romania, 6 areas in Bulgaria and perhaps Lithuania have the advantages that they are close to strategically contested regions in the Middle East. They are halfway between Berlin and Baghdad. There is no need to gain permission for overflight rights from neutral or critical countries. The operational costs are lower in this area. Furthermore, the US have used the war on terrorism to widen its sphere of influence in Asia. Realist analysis has to focus on geopolitical determinants that influence individual political constellations.

Empirical conclusions

Realism has to show that it bears no resemblance to a crude power-supporting strategy. It is no coincidence that a hardline realist like John Mearsheimer put forward convincing arguments against a US attack on Iraq⁶⁵ Deterrence of Saddam Hussein would have sufficed as the dictator was a master in rational behavior, motivated by the will to survive. Realism has a tradition of being a critical theory⁶⁶ Today, no combination of adversaries can hope to equal America's military power under any circumstances. The reason for this fact is highly

⁶² Gilpin 2001:40-41.

⁶³ Countries which had troops in Iraq at one point but have pulled out since: Nicaragua (Feb. 2004); *Spain* (late-Apr. 2004); Dominican Republic (early-May 2004); Honduras (late-May 2004); Philippines (~Jul. 19, 2004); Thailand (late-Aug. 2004); and New Zealand (late Sep. 04). Terrorism is not responsible in all these cases, but micropolitical developments have a huge impact on macropolitical decisions. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm

⁶⁴ Thayer 2003: 21.

⁶⁵ John J. Mearsheimer/Walt, Stephen: An unnecessary war, *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb 2003.

⁶⁶ Morgenthau 1951; George F. Kennan (1984): *American Diplomacy*. The University of Chicago Press.

contested. Liberal (and some realist) observers claim that this is the result of the exceptional, transparent liberal US institutions, the peaceful ideology of unipolarism and the social purpose of power⁶⁷ (However, if states fear the unchecked use of America's power, they may develop an overwhelming desire to wield weapons of terror, and instigate mass destruction to deter America's offensive tactics of self-defense (NSS 2002). The history of the myths of empire suggests that a general strategy of preventive war is likely to bring about precisely the outcome that Bush and Rice wish to avert, especially if the rationalizations for the war is based on lies⁶⁸. The end of the cold war has indicated that conflicts can be solved without recourse to preventive attacks. Furthermore, the war against a nation-state like Iraq or against flexible operating terrorist cells are two different matters.

Reasons for transatlantic differences

The Western alliance altogether has come to realize that its security depends on the survival of peace and democracy in areas beyond its borders. But the decisions to accomplish peace outside of the transatlantic borders have to be made inside these borders – in the legislative process of nation states and their bargains inside international institutions. Although there is unity in the evaluation of recent developments several problems remain unsolved in the Western world.

There is “the most severe (transatlantic) tension in a generation”⁶⁹ This rift is caused by two different factors: (1) a different evaluation of the threats of the 21st century and (2) by a different understanding of the factor of power in world politics.

With some important exceptions in the public opinion, many areas of the German political establishment refuse to acknowledge the diagnosis of some US analysts that by the late 1990s, the world would be living in the second great era of totalitarian politics in modern history. This new totalitarianism was “no longer rooted in Europe but in Europe’s aftereffects combined with indigenous currents coming from both secular Arab radicalism of the Baath, and religious Islamic fundamentalism”⁷⁰. Some call the recent developments in world affairs “reactionary modernism”.

The Europeans, however, have an eye on the socio-economic sources of unrest in the Islamic world. They are suspicious of the manichaic worldview prevailing in large parts of the US. In contrast to the US, whose neoconservatives prefer an offensive solution to the problems in the Middle East⁷¹, the Europeans claim softer solutions for the pacification of the contested region.

The US neocons work with the strategy of an exaggeration of dangers. The fact that Bush managed to convince the public of a fictional connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Kaida is a reliable indicator for the phenomenon that democracies provide no self-evident road to transparency and truth. In dangerous situations the democratic character of U.S. foreign policy is repeatedly endangered (see e.g. Golf of Tonkin resolution 1964; “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq“ joint resolution, in NYT vom 12. Oktober 2002). But the source of misunderstanding in the transatlantic world has deeper roots.

Robert Kagan’s *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* most effectively shows the psychological determinants and consequences of the current rift caused by the power asymmetries in world politics. But the Europeans seem to have understood the

⁶⁷ Contributions in Ikenberry 2002: Ikenberry:19-21, 309-10; Joffe; Risse. ¹ Colin Dueck: „New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy“. In: *International Security*, Spring 2004: 199.

⁶⁸ John J. Mearsheimer: Lying in International Politics. Paper delivered at the 2004 Meeting of the American Political Science Association. August 22, 2004.

⁶⁹ Andrew Moravcsik: Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain. In: *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2003.

⁷⁰ Jeffrey Herf: The "New World Order": From Unilateralism to Cosmopolitanism. In: *Die Zeit online*. http://www.zeit.de/reden/weltpolitik/200409_herf

⁷¹ David Frum/Richard Perle (2003): *An End to Evil – how to win the war on terror*. Random House. New York.

point. For this reason they do not wish to remain compliant vassals of the Americans⁷² They show an increasing willingness to develop an independent security capacity, which means a substantial increase in hard power. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was the first autonomous European Union intervention authorized by the United Nations in 2003 and is the result of a new understanding of human security as opposed to traditional state security. The European Satellite Navigation System GALILEO indicates that the EU wants to develop independent capabilities in strategic areas. The US opposed the project at the end of 2001⁷³.

German foreign policy challenges

German foreign policy has gone through major changes that can only be seen as revolutionary. The quasi pacifist civilian power is now militarily engaged in different missions – a fact that was unimaginable before the red-green coalition came into office. But the ruling elite had to accept the radical change in the security environment since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Germany has currently positioned 7020 soldiers in six different missions⁷⁴ (ISAF, KFOR, SFOR, UNOMIG, EF, UNMEE). The defense policy guidelines of the Bundeswehr (VDR) show that the spectrum of deployments has changed completely. Territorial defense nearly has become obsolete. Furthermore, the use of German military has to be executed exclusively in a multinational context. Germany sees itself as a producer, not only a consumer of security and stability⁷⁵ But the Germans are not intellectually prepared for this larger role and they lack the willingness to make sufficient resources for solid and secure military commitments available. Although the Bundeswehr aims to become an interventionist army, capable of network centric warfare, the margin for substantial investments is much too small. The use of ground troops in Afghanistan (KSK special forces) is the first use of German ground troops after the Second World War. But the defense budget 2005 encompasses only 1,5% GNP⁷⁶. At least the share of investments has risen to 25,6%. But German society has yet to learn that security is not to be taken for granted. For, in the words of Joseph Nye Jr., *security is like oxygen – you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about*. The first step toward normalization of German foreign policy demands a substantial rise in the defense budget that can only be achieved if Germany defines a consistent national interest that is integrated into a wider European geostrategic approach and that can be made plausible to the public. In addition, the Germans can use their enormous amount of soft power they dispose of in the Middle East. The Germans have received a high reputation for their performance in the build-up of police forces and administrative institutions. They could help to build constructive relationships within the Islamic world.

Inside Europe Germany should play a mediating role. The concept of accepting French leadership is dangerous for Germany, because it harms its traditional relationships with the United States and Britain and alienates the new EU and NATO member countries of eastern and central Europe. Especially the lifting of the arms embargo against China would be the wrong signal and would only correspond the French wishes to restore a multipolar world. Only the fact that China puts the threat against China into a law (WP, March 14, 2005) can possibly avoid this politically precarious maneuver.

⁷² Brzezinski's famous word is: "The three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together." *The Grand Chessboard* (1997).

⁷³ "US Warns EU About Galileo's Possible Military Conflicts Brussels" (AFP) Dec 18, 2001.

⁷⁴ <http://www.bundeswehr.de/forces/einsatzzahlen.php>. (September 30, 2004).

⁷⁵ Martin Wagener: *Auf dem Weg zu einer normalen Macht. Die Entsendung deutscher Streitkräfte in der Ära Schröder*. Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik. Nr. 8. February 2004.

⁷⁶ http://www.bmvg.de/ministerium/haushalt/040623_haushalt2005.php, This makes an amount of 24.04 billion Euro.

It would be unwise to follow the sentimental French dream of a multipolar world too closely and equally so an intimate alignment with Russia, although an issue-oriented cooperation with Russia is necessary at least in the field of energy accommodation, because Europe's dependency in this field increases continuously⁷⁷

On the other hand the Germans urgently need a constructive relationship toward the US. But they have endangered this relationship due to domestic constraints. They have lost credibility and favour in the US, which once existed in abundance, as a result of irresponsible handling. „Statesmen like Adenauer and Helmut Schmidt – who both knew very well how to say „No“ to the United States – commended enormous respect in Washington.... They have done it by their powers of communication and attraction – their soft power...“⁷⁸ (Mead 2004: 20).

The United States has no interest to let Europe develop its own power-based foreign policy. The Americans try to define their interests more against the “old European powers” and align themselves more closely with the East European NATO members. The intended troop shifting out of Germany⁷⁹ confirms this assumption. The US seems to work through a policy of traditional balance-of-power thinking, more than through binding institutions⁸⁰. The organizational trade-off after World War II implied that the US agreed to operate within an institutionalized political process, and, in return, its partners have been willing to be appreciative followers. But this procedural consensus is endangered. In a crisis a much celebrated constitutional order (or collective security system) does not work. Prior to the Iraq war the European Union became a traditional Bop-system once more. It was Morgenthau who showed that positivist law always belongs to the sociological context in which it operates. He spoke of international law as “primitive law”.⁸¹

It is foremost the classical realist motive that keeps the transatlantic partners together for some time: the existence of a common enemy. This confirms Lord Salisbury's saying: A nation has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. And again it could be a common enemy, the invisible threat of Islamic terrorism, that forces the transatlantic partners together. The greatest danger for the transatlantic relationship is the continuation of nonsensitive imperialist tendencies in US foreign policy⁸²

Concluding Remarks

Anthropological realism forecasts a recurrence of balancing against the United States in the international system in the long run. Contrary to the views of liberals and realists like Wohlforth, it does not assume that most international agents will accept US hegemony if their relative power toward the United States is to grow. But the facts for rival powers are currently rather bleak because regional powers are “much more likely to have aspirations and gripes regarding each other than regarding the distant unipolar power. Local threats and opportunities are thus much more likely to thwart systemic balancing in this than in other systems.”⁸³ The US works to perpetuate its hegemony through a strategy of engagement as long as this strategy does not directly generate increased terrorist threats to the U.S.

⁷⁷ Judy Dempsey: Russia casts energy web over East Europe. In: IHT, October 1, 2004.

⁷⁸ Walter Russell Mead: Goodbye to Berlin? Germany Looks Askance to Red State America“. In: The National Interest Spring 2004.

⁷⁹ “U.S. bases in Germany” in NYT, June 15, 2004.

⁸⁰ Randall L. Schweller: The Problem of International Order Revisited. *International Security*, Vol. 26., No. 1, Summer 2001.

⁸¹ Russell 1990: 173-174.

⁸² Carlo Masala (2004): Die Zukunft Europäischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im transatlantischen Kontext. In: Reinhard Meier-Walser (2004): Gemeinsam sicher? Vision und Realität europäischer Sicherheitspolitik. Ars Una Verlag. Neuried: 279.

⁸³ William C. Wohlforth: U.S. Strategy in A Unipolar World. In: G. John Ikenberry (2002): 107.

homeland. Then it reaps important dividends in response to unexpected security threats. But to follow the preemptive guidelines of NSS 2002 could be fatal. Bismarck said that preventive war is like committing suicide from fear of death; it would “put the full weight of the imponderables...on the side of the enemies we have attacked”. Nevertheless the United States has to take preventive actions against imminent terrorist threats. But the currently existent mix of measures against both macropolitical and micropolitical threats is dangerous. It is institutionalised in the form of a “national counterterrorist center shall conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.”⁸⁴

A separation of military and police action in a multilateral context would be desirable and peace supporting.

The Europeans, however, try carefully to maintain a cooperative balance with the US. Fundamental differences in values demand different strategies in dealing with difficult players in world politics. As the Europeans still depend on US hard power, they need to be much more efficient in their efforts to build autonomous forces that are capable of intervening in regional conflicts without US support.

Neither the dream of a transatlantic civilization nor the concept of an autonomous European power seem to be realistic scenarios for the future of world politics. The future depends on the seriousness of the threats, defined by terrorists or revisionist regional powers like China.

The evolution of Morgenthau's thought

Morgenthau was socialized in times of danger and in a struggle for survival. Although these experiences shaped his whole life and his theoretical approach, he made some substantial intellectual developments concerning his perspectives on statesmanship, democracy, an interest-based foreign policy or the role of human rights in world politics⁸⁵. The late Morgenthau started to trust in international regimes (SALT I, non-proliferation treaty), but it was always the statesman who had emphatic qualities or who was tempted by a diffuse will-to-power. That means Morgenthau is a moderate structuralist who always stresses the room for voluntaristic action in politics⁸⁶.

We do not know exactly what Morgenthau would have said about current developments in world politics. He surely would have supported the process of European integration which he called a revolutionary process in world affairs as early as in 1948. But he would have supported a Europe with sufficient military capabilities that does not neglect its regional responsibilities. And based on his excellent knowledge of Aristotle he would have stressed the value of stable political societies that were based on a teleological purpose⁸⁷ (without becoming imperialistic units. In his discussion concerning the viability of a world state he convincingly showed that a community of values would be the precondition for such a world state. On the other hand he warned against a simple kind of democracy promotion⁸⁸ that would cause more harm than promote peace and stability. He gave emphasis to the liberal safeguards of democracy and saw the weaknesses of a pure procedural democracy. In this formal definition “Nazism clearly was a democratic machine”, he told a student.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ See Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center of August 27, 2004.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html>

⁸⁵ Rohde (2004): 229.

⁸⁶ John M. Hobson (2000): *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge (GB): Cambridge Univ. Press: 55.

⁸⁷ Antony Lang (2004): *Political Theory and International Affairs – Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle's The Politics*. Westport. Praeger Publishers: 23.

⁸⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau (1965) *Vietnam and the United States*. Washington D. C. Public Affairs Press.

⁸⁹ Lang (2004): 77.

Morgenthau criticised politicians who sold foreign policy in moralistic terms. His criticism of the Truman doctrine was exaggerated⁹⁰ because it did not take into consideration that Truman could only get domestic support for his plans if he appealed to the exceptionalist US values. Realism needs a realistic vision. Morgenthau had received such a vision at the end of his life. In the words of Lebow⁹¹, he cautiously applauded Western European efforts to build a more peaceful continent “on the twin foundations of parliamentary democracy and supranational institutions” and re-affirmed his faith in the democratic political system, combining this with support for the American civil rights movements and a critique of American power politics in Indochina.

Although he was sometimes sceptical about the emotional oscillations of public opinion intervening in international affairs, he became more and more sympathetic toward the values of democracy. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations he became an elaborate defender of democratic values in the US.⁹²

But George W. Bush’s vision of the world would not have been Morgenthau’s. Bush’s unilateralist policy would have provoked Morgenthau’s harsh criticism⁹³. And Morgenthau would have attacked the deceitful political culture of this US administration that works with manipulation and lies and with the targeted exclusion of human rights.

Morgenthau was a prophet who mostly criticised the political mainstream without being a critic sui generis. He wrote and acted in an anticyclical manner.⁹⁴ His thought was one of moderation although he sometimes presented it rather vehemently. And he knew the limits and ambivalence of human interaction in all kinds of social endeavors:

*The political actor, conscious of history,
Must be aware of the malleability of the human will,
Yet he must also be aware of the limits of suasion
And of the need for
Objective barriers to the human will.
While he is making use of suasion,
He must not be oblivious of the role of power, and vice versa,
And of each he must have just the right quantity and quality
Neither too much nor too little,
Neither too early nor too late,
Neither too strong nor too weak.⁹⁵*

⁹⁰ Robert J. Art: HANS J. MORGENTHAU: THE VISIONARY REALIST. REMARKS AT THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON THE REALISM OF HANS J. MORGENTHAU MUNICH, Quandt Stiftung OCTOBER 28-20, 2004: 9-10.

⁹¹ Richard Ned Lebow (2003): *The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests and Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 12.

⁹² Hans J. Morgenthau (1970): *Truth & Power. Essays of A Decade, 1960 – 1970*. London. Pall Mall Press.

⁹³ John J. Herz: Words of Greeting. Paper prepared for workshop “Hans J. Morgenthau – The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism. Quandt BMW Stiftung Munich OCTOBER 28-20, 2004: 9-10.

⁹⁴ This is the result of the extensive biographical studies of Christoph Frei (2001).

⁹⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau: The Lessons of World War II’s mistakes – Negotiations and Armed Power Flexibly Combined. *Commentary*, October 1952: 326.

